Why Do We Believe Humans Matter More than Other Animals? by Hill, Scott & Bertrand, Michael
© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2020 | doi:10.1163/25889567-bja10006
Journal of Applied Animal  
Ethics Research (2020) 1–8
brill.com/jaae
Commentary
∵
Why Do We Believe Humans Matter More than 
Other Animals?
Scott Hill
University of Colorado Boulder, Hellems 169 UCB 232, Boulder, 
CO 80309-0232, USA 
hillscottandrew@gmail.com
Michael Bertrand 
The Ohio State University, 350 University Hall, 230 N Oval Mall, 
Columbus, OH 43210, USA 
bertrand.34@osu.edu
Abstract
Some recent psychological studies suggest that the belief that humans matter more 
than other animals can be strengthened by cognitive dissonance. Jaquet (forthcom-
ing) argues that some of these studies also show that the relevant belief is primar-
ily caused by cognitive dissonance and is therefore subject to a debunking argument. 
We offer an alternative hypothesis according to which we are already speciesist but 
cognitive dissonance merely enhances our speciesism. We argue that our hypothesis 
explains the results of the studies at least as well as Jaquet’s. We then respond to a 
series of objections. Along the way, we highlight various respects in which further stud-
ies are needed to decide between Jaquet’s hypothesis and ours.
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1 Introduction
Most of us believe that humans matter much more than other animals. What 
is the source of this belief? In a series of experiments conducted by Jaquet 
and Cova (Jaquet, forthcoming, 8), respondents were asked to rate their agree-
ment with the following statements on a scale from (1 = strongly disagree) 
to (6 = strongly agree):
– We should always elevate the interests of humans over the interests of 
animals.
– When human interests conflict with animal interests, human interests 
should be given priority.
– Animals shouldn’t be granted the same rights as humans with comparable 
mental capacities.
Meat-eating participants were placed in two groups. One was a manipula-
tion group in which prior to rating, participants read a short vignette offering 
ethical reasons to avoid eating meat. The other was a control group in which 
participants read a vignette offering only non-ethical reasons to avoid meat. 
Members of the control group tended to rate agreement with the relevant 
statements between 3.6 and 3.8. Members of the manipulated group tended 
to rate agreement between 3.8 and 4.2. There were also vegetarian partici-
pants. They tended to rate agreement with the relevant statements around 2 
indicating that they “rather disagree” with the statements. Now consider two 
hypotheses:
1. H1: Meat-eating causes cognitive dissonance which increases speciesist 
belief.
2. H2: Meat-eating causes cognitive dissonance which is the primary cause 
of speciesist belief.
H1 receives support from the experiments conducted by Jaquet and Cova 
(Jaquet, forthcoming, 9). When confronted with a vignette highlighting moral 
reasons to abstain from meat, non-vegetarian participants agreed with specie-
sist statements more strongly than when not so confronted. The hypothesis that 
meat eating enhances speciesist belief by way of cognitive dissonance explains 
this result.
Jaquet argues that the experiments support H2 as well:
What we did via the manipulation wasn’t to create dissonance in our par-
ticipants by confronting them to the meat paradox; we merely increased 
a dissonance that was already there by rendering the paradox more 
salient. But then, their dissonance probably had an effect on their specie-
sist beliefs too, since we know (from the experiment) that cognitive dis-
sonance increases speciesist beliefs (forthcoming, 12).
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The thought is this: We know that cognitive dissonance increases specie-
sist belief from the relevant studies. Furthermore, we know that meat eaters 
in both groups experience cognitive dissonance since their behavior does not 
match some of their beliefs about how animals should be treated. What this 
suggests is that cognitive dissonance is already at work generating speciesist 
beliefs even before the experiment makes the dissonance more salient. So all 
meat eating participants start with a base level of cognitive dissonance prior 
to the studies. And that dissonance is just made more salient for participants 
given the vignette contain moral reasons to avoid meat. Thus, the results of 
the experiments are compatible with H2 and, Jaquet suggests, provide support 
for H2 (forthcoming, 12).
Another consideration Jaquet makes in favor of H2 is that there is a signifi-
cant contrast in reports of speciesist beliefs between meat-eating participants 
(whatever vignette they were given) and the beliefs of vegetarian participants. 
As Jaquet puts it:
Besides the subjects mentioned so far, 81 vegetarian participants took 
part in our experiments, and their scores on the speciesism scale were 
extremely low as compared to those of meat-eaters—their mean result 
corresponded to the answer “rather disagree” (with the speciesist state-
ments). This suggests not only that our meat-eater participants experi-
enced cognitive dissonance, but also that their speciesist beliefs were 
mainly caused by dissonance—indeed, the difference between our con-
trol subjects and our vegetarian participants is easily explained by the for-
mer’s dissonance. All in all, it looks very much like meat-eaters form the 
speciesist belief because they experience dissonance (forthcoming, 13).
The argument is this: The non-meat eaters indicate disagreement with specie-
sist statements. The meat-eaters indicate agreement. The non-meat eaters 
do not experience cognitive dissonance. The meat eaters do. We know from 
the relevant studies that cognitive dissonance is sufficient to generate specie-
sist belief. There is no other obvious candidate for what generates speciesist 
belief. So we should conclude that cognitive dissonance is the primary cause of 
speciesist belief. And in this way the experiments support H2.1
1   Jaquet says that “countless common-sense observations suggest that people do not hold 
speciesist beliefs in specific areas in which their behavior doesn’t harm animals. They are 
for instance vehemently opposed to cockfights, bullfighting, whaling, hunting safaris, and 
dog-meat festivals, unless they partake in these activities” (forthcoming, 12). I think this is 
mistaken. Consider dogs. The standard view is that dogs matter less than humans. But we 
do not eat dogs. The hypothesis that cognitive dissonance merely enhances, but does not 
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2 The Argument from Analogy with Racism
Imagine a study is conducted in the pre-Civil War United States. Imagine the 
study questions include:
–  We should always elevate the interests of white humans over the interests of 
black humans.
–  When white human interests conflict with black human interests, white 
human interests should be given priority.
–  Black humans shouldn’t be granted the same rights as white humans with 
comparable mental capacities.
Imagine that participants in the study answered these questions by rating 
them on a scale ranging from 1 (= Strongly disagree) to 6 (= Strongly agree). 
Now suppose that slave owners given a vignette containing moral reasons to 
avoid slave ownership tended to answer these questions with a rating of 5 and 
slave owners given a vignette containing only non-moral reasons to avoid slave 
ownership tended to answer these questions with a rating of 4. Finally, sup-
pose non-slave owners tended to answer with a rating of 2. This suggests:
1. The hypothesis that racist belief is caused by cognitive dissonance would 
not be supported by the hypothetical pre-Civil War study.
2. If (1), then the hypothesis that speciesist belief is caused by cognitive dis-
sonance is not supported by the studies conducted by Jaquet and Cova.
3. So, the hypothesis that speciesist belief is caused by cognitive dissonance 
is not supported by the studies conducted by Jaquet and Cova.
Regarding premise (1), consider the following hypotheses:
1. H1: Slave-owning causes cognitive dissonance which enhances racist 
belief.
2. H2: Slave-owning causes cognitive dissonance which is the primary cause 
of racist belief.
The hypothetical study would support H1. But it would not support H2. It 
seems to me that any answer to these questions other than “I completely and 
utterly reject this statement” is racist. If a non-slave owner picks 2 and answers 
“rather disagree” instead of “strongly disagree”, then that suggests to me that 
the non-slave owner is racist. It suggests that although they wouldn’t go all the 
way and say that we should always elevate the interests of white humans over 
those of black humans, we should often or at least sometimes do so. That is a 
racist belief. Even picking 1 and indicating that one “strongly disagrees” with 
the relevant claim is compatible with thinking there is some truth to the claim 
cause, speciesist beliefs predicts that we would have speciesist attitudes towards dogs but 
even more speciesist attitudes toward the animals we eat.
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and is therefore compatible with racism. The results of the study support H1. 
But they do not support H2. Rather, they suggest that although slave-owning 
enhances racist belief, it occurs in non-slave owners and so therefore has an 
independent cause.
Regarding premise (2): If we started with the hypothesis that racism is pri-
marily caused by cognitive dissonance in slave-owning and then found out 
that abolitionists reported only some disagreement and not complete dis-
agreement with the racist statements, we would be very surprised. We would 
think that abolitionists are still pretty racist. The difference between the abo-
litionist ratings and the slave-owner ratings is the difference between picking 
the option just under 3 and vacillating between picking 3 and the option just 
over 3. That difference is not that significant. And we would think that some 
other factor, besides cognitive dissonance due to slave-owning is needed to 
explain why we are racists since even the abolitionists are somewhat racist. 
Similarly, if we started with the belief that speciesism is primarily caused by 
cognitive dissonance due to meat-eating and then found out that vegetarians 
reported merely some disagreement and not complete disagreement with the 
speciesist claims, we would be very surprised. We would think vegetarians are 
still pretty speciesist. The difference between vegetarian and meat-eater rat-
ings of agreement with speciesist beliefs is a difference between 2 to 3 and 3 to 
4. That doesn’t seem all that significant. Cognitive dissonance clearly explains 
how we move from the latter range of scores to the former. But it doesn’t yet 
explain, or at the very least, it isn’t required to explain why we start with a level 
of speciesism at the 2 to 3 range. And whatever the cause of speciesist beliefs, 
it can’t just be cognitive dissonance from meat-eating. There has to be some 
other source as well.
3 Objections and Replies
First Objection: It is a well-known phenomenon in experimental psychology 
that participants rarely give answers in the extremes (1 or 6). So it is not sur-
prising that vegetarian participants’ mean answer was 2 rather than 1, even 
assuming that their cognitive dissonance is extremely low. In these conditions, 
there is no need to attribute speciesist beliefs in order to account for the data.
Reply: If this is correct, then the experiment is not sufficiently fine grained 
to distinguish between the hypothesis that vegetarians are less speciesist than 
meat eaters but still speciesest and the hypothesis that vegetarians are not 
speciesest at all. For whatever the vegetarians’ views about the comparative 
value of humans and other animals are, they are unlikely to pick 1. If they pick 
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in the 3 to 4 range they will approximate the answers of meat eaters. Picking 
around 2 they indicate that they are less speciesest than meat eaters. But they 
do not indicate whether they are not speciesest at all. Further experiments are 
needed to test between the relevant hypotheses. This is consistent with the 
claim that our hypothesis fits the data at least as well as Jaquet’s.
Second Objection: Vegetarians too have interests that conflict with those 
of animals—especially if they keep consuming eggs and dairy. So, one might 
expect them to exhibit some amount of dissonance too, which would in turn 
have some effect on their speciesism scores.
Reply: That is possible. It is also possible that vegetarians feel proud of them-
selves for doing much more to treat animals better than most humans. And the 
contrast between their behavior and the behavior of humans who treat them 
even worse is sufficient to relieve the relevant cognitive dissonance. It is pos-
sible that vegetarians enjoy bravely facing up to their wrongdoing and so they 
embrace the fact that they treat animals less well than they should be treated. 
It is also possible that because vegetarians have put in effort towards the cause 
of animal welfare, that their investment causes them to exaggerate the extent 
to which non-human animals matter so that they can feel more secure in their 
dedication to the cause. Any of these processes might be at work in addition to 
cognitive dissonance. Further experimental work is needed.
Third Objection: It would indeed be better for respondents in the racism 
example to say I completely and utterly reject this statement. This would be evi-
dence that they have very strong antiracist beliefs. And that is the appropriate 
attitude. Yet, when someone says I strongly disagree with P, this cannot be evi-
dence that they believe that P. It is evidence that they disbelieve P. Between 
antiracist beliefs and racist beliefs, there is suspension of judgment, which 
our hypothetical participants would have expressed had they answered 3. 
Only numbers greater than 3 express racist beliefs. Picking 2 indicates anti-
racist beliefs.
Reply: Distinguish between disagreeing with P and disagreeing with propo-
sitions nearby P. Consider the proposition that all swans are black. Contrast 
it with other propositions such as some swans are black and a few swans are 
black. If a participant was asked to indicate agreement with all swans are black 
on a scale from 1 to 6 and they pick 2, we would conclude that they believe 
the relevant proposition is false. But we would not conclude that they think 
some swans are black and a few swans are black is false. Similarly, if a partici-
pant is asked to indicate agreement with We should always elevate the interests 
of humans over the interests of animals on a scale between 1 and 6 and they 
pick 2 indicating strong disagreement, we would think that they believe the 
relevant proposition is false. But we would not conclude that they think We 
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should sometimes elevate the interests of humans over the interests of animals is 
false. And agreement with that nearby proposition is sufficient for humans to 
be speciesest.
Fourth Objection: Jaquet’s hypothesis (H1 above) is simpler than ours. He 
posits only cognitive dissonance (forthcoming, 9). That is sufficient to explain 
the data. We also posit cognitive dissonance. But we posit another factor as 
well. A simpler hypothesis is to be preferred over a more complicated one. So 
Jaquet’s hypothesis is to be preferred over ours.
Reply: We do not see how Jaquet’s hypothesis is simpler than ours. Both 
hypotheses posit many psychological processes. There is cognitive dissonance. 
And there are all the other cognitive process that produce judgments about 
what matters. On our view, at least one of the later processes causes us to believe 
humans matter more than other animals. And then that belief is enhanced and 
distorted by cognitive dissonance. On Jaquet’s hypothesis, the later processes 
would cause us to believe that humans do not matter more than other animals 
but those processes are overturned by cognitive dissonance.
Fifth Objection: We suggest that Jaquet’s central claim is:
H2: Cognitive dissonance in meat-eaters is the primary cause of specie-
sist belief.
But there is another way to read Jaquet (forthcoming). Perhaps he is instead 
suggesting that cognitive dissonance has enough of an influence on speciest 
belief that it makes it an off track process. In that case, Jaquet’s debunking 
argument would still receive support from the relevant studies.
Reply: Virtually all of our beliefs are subject to some degree of influence 
from off-track processes. But we are arguing, and the objector is granting, that 
there is a significant amount of speciesism in the absence of meat-eating. So, 
there is another process at work that has enough influence on its own to pro-
duce the beliefs independently of cognitive dissonance. To secure a debunking 
argument, we need to know whether that other process is off track in order to 
support the broad conclusion that speciesism is an off track belief. But the rel-
evant studies do not provide any evidence for the claim that that other process 
is off track.
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